Page generated: 06 Nov 2026, 03:49 UTC
← Dashboard

CVE-2026-61826

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous …

Read full description
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
CVSS 10.0 (CRITICAL)

Attention and evidence

HYPE SCORE
1.6/10
REALITY · THREAT PRIORITY
3.5/10
General review priority; not probability

Evidence confidence: Insufficient evidence

Why this priority?
  • Technical severity: CVSS 10: +3.50
  • Fresh EPSS: 0.26%: +0.01

General review priority, not probability, victim count or asset-specific risk. A range covers missing CVSS/EPSS inputs within the current evidence state.

Sources: 1 documents and public datasets.

Hype components

Headline sample (25%)
50/100
Press, 30 days (60%)
5/100
Grounded branding (15%)
0/100
HYPE TOTAL16/100

Sources and documents

2-Spyware
Press · 09 Oct 2026, 06:49 · Exploited now: vulnerabilities under active attack - 2-Spyware

Score evolution

● Hype   ● Reality

Earlier evidence-support scores are retained in history; this chart shows only the current priority definition.

First record: hype 1.6 · reality 3.5 (2026-11-02 15:14). The curve appears once the score changes.

Public exploit evidence

0

Public exploit entries / repo candidates

Evidence context and dated references

Reality is general threat/review priority, combining observed exploitation, CVSS severity and fresh EPSS. Evidence confidence is separate. This is not calibrated risk, a victim count or an asset-specific assessment. A range reflects missing numeric inputs. Published 6 days ago. Exploitation evidence usually takes weeks to show up: a low reality score can mean there is no data yet, not that the flaw is mild.

Evidence in context

Confidence in exploitation evidence
Insufficient evidence
Priority basis
Exploitation in attacks unconfirmed; CVSS 10; EPSS 0.3%
Attention, last 30 days
1 distinct story titles; 1 press documents; 1 publisher domains.
Technical potential
network access, no prior privileges, no user interaction.
Observed activity
No exploitation observation is recorded.
Known scale
Not quantified.
Evidence confidence basis
Insufficient evidence

Score evaluated: 2026-11-05 14:00:18.726279+00:00 · EPSS snapshot: 2026-11-05T12:03:04Z

Source event timeline
First press mention
09 Oct 2026, 06:49
Latest press mention
09 Oct 2026, 06:49
Published
30 Oct 2026, 17:12
Score calculated
05 Nov 2026, 14:00