CVE-2026-115770

Read full description

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

CVSS 9.6 (CRITICAL)

Attention and evidence

HYPE SCORE

0.0/10

REALITY · THREAT PRIORITY

3.4/10

General review priority; not probability

Evidence confidence: Insufficient evidence

Why this priority?

Technical severity: CVSS 9.6: +3.36
Fresh EPSS: 0.17%: +0.00

General review priority, not probability, victim count or asset-specific risk. A range covers missing CVSS/EPSS inputs within the current evidence state.

Sources: 1 documents and public datasets.

Hype components

Headline sample (25%)

0/100

Press, 30 days (60%)

0/100

Grounded branding (15%)

0/100

HYPE TOTAL0/100

Sources and documents

Latest Vulnerabilities

Technical advisory · 04 Nov 2026, 22:32 · CVE-2026-115770 - Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

Score evolution

● Hype ● Reality

━ Hype Score (Perceived) ━ Reality threat priority. Definition changes are not new attacks.

Public exploit evidence

Public exploit entries / repo candidates

Evidence context and dated references

Reality is general threat/review priority, combining observed exploitation, CVSS severity and fresh EPSS. Evidence confidence is separate. This is not calibrated risk, a victim count or an asset-specific assessment. A range reflects missing numeric inputs. Published 2 days ago. Exploitation evidence usually takes weeks to show up: a low reality score can mean there is no data yet, not that the flaw is mild.

Evidence in context

Confidence in exploitation evidence: Insufficient evidence
Priority basis: Exploitation in attacks unconfirmed; CVSS 9.6; EPSS 0.2%
Attention, last 30 days: 0 distinct story titles; 0 press documents; 0 publisher domains.
Technical potential: network access, low privileges, no user interaction.
Observed activity: No exploitation observation is recorded.
Known scale: Not quantified.
Evidence confidence basis: Insufficient evidence

Score evaluated: 2026-11-05 13:59:54.760909+00:00 · EPSS snapshot: 2026-11-05T12:03:04Z

Source event timeline

Published

04 Nov 2026, 22:32

Score calculated

05 Nov 2026, 13:59